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Abstract 
This study evaluates the impact of managerial ownership on the firm‟s performance and financial 
policies in the context of Pakistani market for sixty non-financial firms included in KSE 100 index for 
the period of 2000 to 2007. The analysis support that the concentration of managerial ownership affects 
the firms financial policies, mainly the leverage and dividend policies. The empirical analysis find out 
that leverage policy variable influenced managerial ownership negatively, supporting that the lower 
leverage level leads to high profitability firms engage in low managers‟ ownership program. The result 
also determines a negative and significant association among the mangers ownership concentration and 
dividend policy of the firms. This result is supported by the agency theory prediction suggesting that as 
a firm has high managerial ownership, the asymmetric information will decrease and directly decrease 
the effectiveness of the dividend policy. Beside this the firms with higher managerial ownership 
decrease their perquisites, so the conflict between manager‟s shareholders can be settled. It is also 
observed that the managers‟ ownership concentration in general has a positive relationship with the 
performance in the corporate culture of Pakistan, where major firms are the family oriented. When the 
managerial ownership is divided in three levels, low level (0 -5%), moderate level (5%-25% and high 
concentrated (above 25%), the performance positively affect only at low and moderate level. The 
ownership beyond 25% has a negative association with performance and support the entrenchment 
theory 
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1. Introduction 
The literature on corporate governance presumes a fundamental tension between shareholders and 
corporate managers (Berle and Means, 1932 and Jensen and Meckling, 1976). While the objective of a 
corporation's shareholders is a return on their investment, managers are likely to have other goals, such 
as the power and prestige of running a large and powerful organization, or entertainment and other 
perquisites of their position. In this situation, managers' superior access to inside information and the 
relatively powerless position of the numerous and dispersed shareholders means that managers are 
likely to have the upper hand. The researchers have offered a number of solutions for this agency 
problem between shareholders and managers which fall under the categories of incentive alignment, 
monitoring, and discipline. Incentives of managers and shareholders can be aligned through practices 
such as stock options or other market-based compensation (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Monitoring by an 
independent and engaged board of directors assures that managers behave in the best interests of the 
shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Chief Executive Officer (CEO)'s who fail to maximize 
shareholder interests can be removed by concerned boards of directors, and a firm that neglects 
shareholder value is disciplined by the market through hostile takeover (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). 
The influential work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) has given momentum to the corporate ownership 
literature by focusing on the separation of ownership control that gives rise to potential conflicts 
between principals and agents. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that managerial ownership in a firm 
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helps to align the interest of owner and managers and therefore justifying agency problems. An 
alternative argument is that managers get entrenched when there is high managerial ownership thereby 
exacerbating the agency problems (Demsetz, 1983; Fama and Jensen, 1983) 
The agency costs of equity can be reduced by the third party (debt-holders) to participate in 
monitoring management while at the same time providing the more structured decision-making by 
means of contract. Trade off between agency cost of equity and agency costs of debt can be adjusted 
through dividend and leverage mechanism called as a balancing model of agency cost. Leverage policy 
is taken to share the agency cost previously borne by stockholders to debt holders so agency cost of 
equity declines, but compensated with the presence of agency cost of debt. Decision making in 
dividend and financial policies then affect agency costs borne by the stockholders and debt holders. 
Agency cost can be controlled through interdependence mechanism between dividend and leverage 
policies. Copeland and Weston (1992) suggest that when leverage increases, agency costs of debt rises. 
The higher the leverage level, the more likely for a firm to fill for bankruptcy and debt-holders require 
additional return to compensate the additional financial risk. The firms are mixture of outside debt and 
equity financing, where as dividends reduce the costs of these agency conflicts. While leverage reduces 
the conflict of outside equity, managerial ownership and dividend are important because they reduce 
the conflict of interest between managers and outside shareholders. Crutchley and Hansen (1989), 
Leland and Pyle (1977) and Ross (1977) present hypothesis the managerial ownership and financial 
policies help resolve information asymmetry managers and external investors.  
The problems in decision making especially with aligned of interest between agent and 
principal will leads to appalling decreasing value of the firm. Decision making policy such as dividend 
and leverage will increase value of the firm as long as the policy able to aligned the self-interest 
behavior between parties. Separation between ownership and control arise agency problem. Managerial 
ownership on the other side, try to decrease agency problem by pooling back the ownership structure 
and control mechanism of the firm. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) describe the importance of ownership 
structure as control mechanism in agency problem. They investigate firm performance and mechanism 
to control agency problems. Their findings support managerial ownership as mechanism of control and 
affect firm performance. In addition, concentration shareholding by institutional or by block holders 
can increase managerial monitoring and improve firm performance, as can outside representation on 
corporate bonds. The use of debt financing can improve performance by inducing monitoring by 
lenders.  
The relationship between manager‟s shareholding and firm‟s performance report mixed 
empirical findings. Two important evidences emerge from the empirical literature
1
. First most of these 
studies provide evidence that insider ownership actually affect firm‟s value, although the relationship 
doesn‟t seem to be monotonic. A positive impact of insider ownership on firm value can be explained 
by the convergence of interest hypothesis, stating that large equity shares of insider should be 
associated with higher market valuation due to lower agency costs. In contrast,  a negative relationship 
can be explained by the entrenchment hypothesis, predicating that insider ownership above a certain 
threshold will have a value destroying effect due to the inherent conflict between large block holders 
(in this case the management) and the dispersed shareholders. These two hypothesis serve as an 
explanation for the bell-shaped relationship between insider ownership and firm value find by 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) or the piecewise linear relationship discover by Moreck et al. (1988).  
The code of corporate governance introduced by SECP in early 2002 is the major step in 
corporate governance reforms in Pakistan. The code includes many recommendations in line with 
international good practice. The major areas of enforcement include reforms of board of directors in 
                                                 
1
 For example Oswlad and Jahera (1991), Mehran (1995). Holthausan and Lacker (1996), Cole and Mehran (1998) find a 
positive relationship between managerial ownership and performance, Jarrell and Poulsen (1988), Slovin and Sushka (1993) 
find a negative relationship whilst Morck et al. (1988), Herman and Weishbach (1991) document a non-linear relationship. 
Other empirical evidence shows that this relationship is statistically insignificant (Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Deserts and 
Villalonga., 2001). 
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order to make it accountable to all shareholders and better disclosure including improved internal and 
external audits for listed companies. However, the code‟s limited provisions on director‟s 
independence remain voluntary and provide no guidance on internal controls, risk management and 
board compensation policies. In Pakistan manufacturing sector 59 percent of the firms are family 
owned companies and the major shares of these companies are by the owners and managers of the 
firms (Cheema et. al., 2003). Beside this these firm‟s have pyramid structure and cross holding 
ownership structure which leads to agency conflict and the outsiders especially in case of business 
groups  face difficulty to understand the ownership structure of these companies. The family owned 
companies are typically managed by owners themselves. In case of state owned enterprises and 
multinationals there is often direct relationship between state/foreign owners and management again 
bypassing the boards and many important corporate decisions are not made on Boards Annual General 
Meetings (AGMs) level. The code explicit mentions director‟s duties to act with objective and 
independent judgment and in the best interest of company. In business groups boards are dominated by 
executives and non-executives members of controlling family and by proxy directors appointed to act 
their behalf. Inter-locking directorships are often used to retain majority control. Family dominated 
boards are less able to protect minority shareholders right and risk a loss of competitiveness as other 
boards become more professional. 
The main focus of the present study is to examine that financial decisions (leverage and 
dividend) are affected by managerial ownership. The study also investigate what factors determines the 
managerial ownership in case of KSE listed non-financial firms  The affect of managerial ownership on 
firm‟s performance is examined as the managerial ownership and financial policies help resolve 
information asymmetry between managers and external investors. 
 
The plan of the study is as follows. The second section briefly reviews the empirical literature 
review. The methodology and data are discussed in section three. The empirical results are presented in 
section four and last section concludes the study. 
 
2 Literature Review 
There is large body of empirical literature that links the relationship between the ownership structures, 
firm‟s value and the financial policies of the firms. The empirical studies about the role of block 
shareholders strongly emphasize that external block holders have incentives to monitor and influence 
management appropriately to protect their significant investments (Friend and Lang, 1988). Due to the 
large economic venture, the investors need to look over the management closely, that the managers don‟t 
engage in activities that are unfavorable to the wealth of shareholders. External shareholders reduce the 
scope of managerial opportunism, resulting in lower direct agency conflicts between management and 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Same evidence is obtained by Shome and Singh (1995) while 
examining the market reaction to the announcement of acquisitions of large share parcels using event 
study methodology. They report significant positive abnormal returns related with announcements of 
block acquisitions by the external share holders and the abnormal returns are positively associated with a 
reduction in agency costs (through proxy variables). Furthermore, Bethel et al. (1998) find that long term 
operating performance of firms improves subsequent to the acquisition of a block by activist 
shareholders.  
De Anglo and Masulis (1980) find that leverage and dividend are relevant if tax and non-
equilibrium condition exist. Koch and Shoney (1999) observe that there is interdependence between 
leverage and dividend policies concurrently having a significant effect on future cash leverage policy. 
Harton and Ratnaningsih (2003) show that dividend policy serves as a mechanism affecting leverage 
policy. Solberg and Zorn (1992) scrutinize interdependence among three policies, leverage, dividend, 
and insider ownership and find that leverage and dividend do affect managerial ownership, while 
managerial ownership affects financing and dividend policy. Crutchley and Hansen (1989) finding 
supports agency theory arguing that agency costs of equity and agency costs of debt can be managed 
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and controlled by means of interdependence between leverage, dividend and insider ownership. Healy 
and Palepu (1989) outline, the two decisions of managers that generally have significant impact on 
stock prices are: choice of how much debt to hold in the firm‟s capital structure, and choice of how 
much of earnings to pay out as dividends. Rozeff (1982) reports that managerial ownership act as 
substitute for dividend as an agency cost reducing benefit. Gerald, Donald and Tomas (1992) conclude 
that level of insider ownership has negative influence on a firm‟s debt and dividend levels. Insider 
ownership itself is related to variables that proxy for the wealth gains from the control potential of the 
firm. Their result suggests that agency costs and bankruptcy costs also affect a firm‟s financing 
decisions. Bathala et al. (1994) support the notion that institutional investors serve as effective 
monitoring agents and help in mitigating agency cost and they find that the debt ratio is inversely 
related to managerial equity ownership, R&D expenses and growth.  Dutta (1999) find that in spite of 
regulation, insider ownership still serves as substitute signal for dividends, alternately banks with 
higher levels of managerial equity ownership may systematically choose to pay lower levels of 
dividends, as managers wish to avoid incurring the penalty of double taxation. It is also possible that 
higher levels of insider ownership may lead banks to retain more cash flows for other purpose. 
Mahadwartha (2002) shows that lower dividend level leads to higher probability firms engaging in 
managerial ownership programs to maintain the effectiveness of reducing agency cost of equity. Hence 
there is managerial ownership; the usefulness of dividend policy to control agency cost of equity will 
be lower. 
The association between ownership structure and firms performance has been the subject of 
important and ongoing debate in the corporate finance literature. Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) 
examine the association between ownership structure and performance measured as cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) by the firm and find that there is significant negative relationship between 
CAR and anti takeover amendments adoption and the positive relationship between CAR and 
institutional ownership, concentration of institutional ownership and ownership by 5% block holders. 
However, insider ownership at any level has no effect on CAR. McConnell and Servaes (1990, 1995) 
show that there is positive affect of block holder‟s ownership on Tobin‟s Q.  Himmelberg et al. (1999) 
study the determents of managerial ownership and the extent to which his ownership is endogenously 
determined by the contracting environment. The study concludes that managerial ownership and firm 
performance are determined by common characteristics some of which are unobservable to 
econometrician. Kaserer and Moldenhaure (2007) provide the evidence outside block ownership as 
well as more concentration insider ownership have positive impact on corporate performance in case of 
German firms.  Hanson and Song (1999) results are consistent with the notion that effective internal 
control system requires unaffiliated outside directors to monitor managers and stock ownership by 
chief executive officer to align the interest of decision making with shareholders. Khanna (2007) 
document that managerial ownership has a significant relationship with firm value controlling for firm 
fixed effects.  The firm‟s value is impacted by managerial ownership through managerial actions of 
higher labor expenses, accrual management and conservative capital structure. Fahlenbrach and Stulz 
(2008) find that managers are more likely to significantly decrease their ownership when their firms are 
performing well and more likely to increase their ownership when their firms become financially 
constrained. The results also suggest that large increase in managerial ownership increase Tobin‟s q, 
and find no evidence that large decrease in ownership has an adverse impact on firm value. Li et al. 
(2007) find that firms where managerial ownership is high appear to control the growth of their assets 
more carefully in relation to their profit growth, so the return on assets exhibits a lower decline relative 
to other firms.  
The relation between managerial ownership and the market value of a firm is not a linear 
relationship, as investigated by Mrock et al. (1988) and find that the market value of the firm first 
increases as insider holdings increase from 0 to 5%, then, as insider holdings increase from 5 to 25% 
the market value of the firm decrease. Finally, as managerial ownership increased beyond 25% the 
market value of the decrease. This result provides an evidence of managerial entrenchment. While 
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lower and higher levels of insider holdings support the notion of insider holdings leading to lower 
agency costs, the middle level of ownership is a range over which the benefits of net value maximizing 
behavior on the part of managers exceeds the costs incurred by the lower market price of their equity 
holding. Welch (2003) and Kahn et al. (2007) develop a general non-linear model based on the study 
of Mrock et al. (1988), but they fail to find any significant relationship. Craswell et al. (1997) find 
significant curvilinear relationship only for large firms with a turning point of around managerial 
ownership of 50%. For the piecewise regression, they use the thresholds used by Morck et al. (1988) as 
well as some other thresholds but they fail to find any significant relationship. The findings by Chen et 
al. (1993) are consistent with the prediction that at a low level of management ownership, both external 
and internal factors, market for corporate control and management‟s opposition to takeovers all 
operative to guarantee a positive relationship between managerial ownership and firm value. Short and 
Keasey (1999) find out that there is positive significant effect of director ownership and cubic 
ownership but has a significant negative effect of squared ownership. The polynomials reach its 
maximum at 16% and its minimum at 42% ownership. The significant control variables are size and 
growth.  
 
3 Methodological Framework and Data 
3.1 Managerial Ownership and Financial Polices 
The conflict of agency cost between the managers and shareholder are genuine and very difficult to 
efficiently reduce. One of the ways to control this matter is for the firm is to issue debt. Leverage 
policy act as a bonding force for the managers to communicate their good intentions to outside 
shareholders. Because taking on the debt validate that managers are willing to risk losing control of 
their firm if they fail to perform effectively. As bonding mechanism, leverage policy will decrease 
agency conflict of equity but increase the agency cost of debt (Megginson, 1997).  
Mahadwarth and Hartono (2002) find a negative relationship between managerial ownership 
and leverage policy. The firms have managerial ownership program will trend to lower their debt level 
to reduced the agency conflict. These results also support by the Friend and Lang (1988). The 
association between leverage policies and managerial ownership program is expected to be negative. 
Less leverage will increase the probability of a firm to engaging managerial ownership program to 
multiply the effect the agency cost. Therefore, the following hypothesis is tested: 
 
H1: There is a negative relationship between leverage and managerial ownership. 
 
Titman and Wessels (1988) argue that a high growth rate indicates greater flexibility in future 
investments and offers greater opportunities for expropriating wealth from debt holders. Secondly, a 
high growth rate indicates the probability and success of the firm in investing more resources into the 
firm. This in turn could be associated with lower information asymmetry costs of equity and hence a 
preference for equity over debt financing. Myers and Mujlaf (1999) have suggested a negative 
coefficient for the growth variables. In this study book to market value of equity is defined as growth 
and used as the proxy of investment opportunity. The hypothesis becomes: 
 
  H2: There is a positive relationship between leverage and Growth. 
 
According to the agency theory framework, the interest of managers of the firms having high 
managerial ownership, support the interest of the outside share holders and reduced the role of the debt 
as an agency conflict mitigating devices. Agency theory argues that dividend policy as bonding 
mechanism to control expropriation of firm‟s cash flows. Dividend payment avoids management from 
undergoing perquisites action since cash flow is absorbed to pay dividend for stockholders. Firms with 
established bonding mechanism and dispersed ownership structure are usually big firms that trend to 
pay dividend to reduced agency conflict between management and shareholders. On the other hand, 
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small firms with concentration of ownership structure to certain persons or institution tend to have 
lower dividend due to relatively less agency conflict (Megginson.1997) thus firm‟s size matter in 
controlling dividend effect to management ownership. If management has ownership of firms‟ share 
then dividend will decrease. Another argument is dividend payment reduces firm‟s asymmetric 
information. However if firm already has managerial ownership, asymmetric information by definition 
declines and less dividend is needed for information (Megginson, 1997). Zorn (1982) and Rozaff 
(1982) find that dividend policy is affected by firms‟ ownership structure negatively. The hypotheses 
that we are going to test becomes: 
 
H3: There is a negative relationship between managerial ownership and dividend. 
 
To some extent the past asset growth predict the future profitability, and the growth potential managers 
would be less resultant to invest in the firms‟ equity. The managers could take the advantage of the 
internal information about the growth prospects of the firm. Managers due to their best knowledge of 
the projects being commenced by the firms will be more inclined than the external investors to be on 
the growth prospects. Se we develop hypothesis that: 
 
H4: There is a positive relationship between managerial ownership and growth. 
 
Emmery and Finnerty (1997) suggest that firms with higher dividend level will need additional funds 
from debt holders. Miller and Rock (1985) also support this argument that higher dividend is a signal 
of firms increasing profitability in the future. Management sign positive signal through dividend 
payment that investors realize there is promising investment opportunity which will increase firm‟s 
value. In addition, higher payment indicates that firms utilize more leverage to fund investment to keep 
their capital structure optimum. In the same way Rozeff (1985) argues that higher dividends payments 
reduce agency conflict between managers and shareholders and finds evidence of relationship among 
growth, profitability and dividend. Moreover, the documented empirical relationships between 
dividends and profitability suggest that profitability could help to capture real difference among firms. 
Investment and growth opportunities affect the dividend policy of the firms. Brook (1984) indicates 
that if agency cost is high, shareholders invite third party to bear the costs. Debt holders monitor the 
use of their fund and usually through what is called as debt covenant. Hartono and Ratanningsih (2003) 
argue that dividend policy positively affects firms leverage policy; on contrast to leverage policy 
doesn‟t affect dividend policy. We test the following hypothesis: 
 
H5: There is a positive  relationship between dividend and leverage. 
 
In this study we take growth as proxy of the investment opportunity set (Kallapur and Trombley, 
1999). High growth firms have to choose either to pay dividend or to implement capital expenditure 
related to existing investment opportunity. Imperfect capital market leads to some kind of competition 
between dividend policy and investment funding in using existing internal cash flows. Free cash flows 
hypothesis suggest that firms with higher growth pay fewer dividends since most of retained earnings 
have already been used for dividend increase reflects management confidence about favorable 
prospects in the future given the sticky dividend assumption. The decision to choose the proportion of 
dividend paid for outside stockholders is expected to support the hypothesis that in a situation in which 
managerial ownership exists, signaling hypothesis cannot explain dividend policy phenomenon. 
 
H6: There is a positive  relationship between dividend and growth. 
 
The main issue in estimating the econometric relationship between managerial ownership and financial 
polices is due to the problem of endogenty. Keeping in view the problem of endogenty the 
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simultaneous regression equations are derived to explain the effect of managerial ownership on the 
firms‟ financial policies. To test the above hypothesis the empirical specification of the model 
proposed by Jensen et al. (1992) is used: 
 
iiiiiii SIZENEGDIVMOLEV   543210                             (1) 
iiiiiii SIZENEGDIVLEVMO   543210                             (2) 
iiiiiii SIZENEGLEVMODIV   654210                                 (3) 
 
Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) is adopted as estimation technique and first lag of dependent and 
independent variables are used as instruments. The simultaneous equation model is estimated with 
2SLS in a system comprising of interdependent endogenous variables. The 2SLS method is preferred 
over the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method as the latter would lead to biased and inconsistent 
parameter estimates 
 
3.2 Managerial Ownership and Firm’s Performance   
Large empirical literature investigates the relationship between managerial ownership and firm‟s 
performance and provides mixed evidence. Wruck (1989) finds non-linear relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm‟s performance. Similarly Berle and Means (1932) provide the evidence 
that an inverse relationship exist between managerial ownership and firm‟s performance. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that agency cost and managerial ownership are negatively related and have 
positive relationship between managerial ownership and firm‟s performance. The convergence of 
interest hypothesis suggests a positive relationship between managerial ownership and firm‟s 
performance due to lower agency cost. While a negative relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm‟s performance is suggested by the entrenchment hypothesis, explaining that managerial 
ownership above a certain threshold will have destroying effect due to the conflict between large block 
holders. The above two hypothesis suggest a bell-shaped relationship between managerial ownership 
and firm‟s performance. Higher managerial ownership in the firm motivates the managers to perform 
well due to the incentive alignment. A manager owning the large fraction of the shares in the firm bears 
the consequences of managerial action that either create or destroy the performance. As consequences 
with managers shareholders are likely to work hard and create better investment decisions and high 
managerial ownership firms should perform better. This study follows the agency theory frame work 
and following null hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H7: There is a positive relationship between managerial ownership and firm’s performance 
 
Among different ownership pattern managerial ownership seems to be the most controversial as it has 
ambivalent effects on firm performance. On the one hand, it is considered as a tool for alignment of 
managerial interest with those of shareholders. Managerial ownership provides managers with 
monetary incentives to maximize profit and thus improve company performance (Jenson and 
Meckling, 1976). On the other hand, managerial ownership promotes entrenchment of managers which 
is especially costly when they have low qualification or prefer to live an easy life (Morck et al., 1988 
and. Stultz, 1988). On these findings we develop the following hypothesis: 
 
H8: Only a moderate level of managerial shareholding can affect firm performance positively. 
 
Managerial share ownership can be reduced managerial incentives to consume perquisites, expropriate 
shareholder‟s wealth and to go engage in other non-maximizing behavior and thereby helps in aligning 
between management and shareholders. This is the convergence of interest hypothesis which is 
challenged by Fama and Jensen (1983) and Deserts (1983). They advocate that managerial share 
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ownership may have adverse effects on agency conflicts between management and shareholders due to 
the costs of significant managerial share ownership. They argue that instead of reducing managerial 
incentive problems, managerial share ownership may establish the in office management team, leading 
to an increase in managerial opportunism. According to Fama (1980), there are incentives for the 
managers to control the rest of the managerial team members. On the one hand, there is competition 
among the top managerial team to achieve the highest and most prestigious positions in the company. 
This competition encourages monitoring amongst managers, since non-value enhancing activities by 
other members of the managerial team could give some advantage to the rest of the managers to 
achieve top positions. On the other hand, the managerial labor market motivates managers to supervise 
each other‟s actions. Non-value maximizing activities by a member of the managerial team can have a 
negative impact on the firm‟s market value, which in turn can reduce the value of the whole group of 
managers in the managerial labor market. The expansion of the negative consequences of an 
individual‟s opportunistic actions to the rest of the managerial team encourages mutual monitoring 
amongst managers. 
The capability of the managers to perform mutual monitoring depends on the dispersion of 
managerial power, a mutual monitoring system being more difficult to establish when there is a clear 
concentration of power in the hands of a single manager. If a single member of the managerial team 
clearly dominates the others, the rest of the managers could lack the power or even the information to 
control the head of the organization. Fernandez and Arrondo (2005) and Stultz (1988) show that 
sufficiently high managerial ownership by allowing managers to block takeover bids, can lower firm 
value. Morck et al. (1988); McConnell and Servaes (1990, 1995); Hermalin and Weisbch (1991); and 
Holderness et al. (1999) find firm value to rise with low levels of managerial ownership and to fall 
with higher levels of managerial ownership. The combination of the convergence of interests and 
entrenchment hypotheses suggest a curvilinear relationship between managerial share ownership and 
corporate value. Studies such as Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990) and McConnell 
and Servaes (1995) find a non-linear relationship between managerial share ownership and firm value. 
These studies recommend that at low levels of managerial share ownership, managerial hare ownership 
increases firm value due to the convergence of interests effect. The hypothesis becomes: 
 
H9:  There is non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firms performances. 
 
To test the above mentioned hypothesis three performance measures are used: return on asset (ROA), 
return on equity (ROE) and Tobin Q. The performance measures are regressed on managerial 
ownership shares and a set of control variables following Chen and Hu (1993). This leads to the 
estimation of following equations: 
 
iiiiii SIZENEGLEVDIVMOROA   654321101                 (4)  
iiiiii SIZENEGLEVDIVMOROE   654321101                 (5) 
iiiiii SIZENEGLEVDIVMOQ   654321101                      (6) 
 
The estimation procedure for the test of hypothesis is regression framework of panel data estimation 
technique. The techniques of pooled time series of cross sectional are applicable in situation in which 
the observations are on N firms for t points in time such as yearly in our case. There are two 
approaches for estimation of the panel data; the fixed effects model (FEM) and the random effect 
model (REM). The panel data estimation technique takes account of endogeniety and hetroskedasticity 
in the data. 
 
 
3.3 Data and Sample Selection 
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To perform econometric estimation, the sample includes non-financial firms of KSE 100 index for the 
period 2000 to 2007. KSE 100 index consists of 100 firms, financial and non-financial companies out 
of which there are 67 non-financial listed companies. Initially we start with 67 firms listed in different 
sectors, however, due to unavailability of published reports for some firms we exclude seven firms 
from our sample. At the end we get sample of 60 firms representing manufacturing sector of KSE 100 
index. The selected firms cover 80% of market capitalization in year 2008. Most of the variables are 
obtained from Balance Sheet Analysis of listed firms published by the State Bank of Pakistan
2
. While 
the ownership variables are calculated from the annual reports of the selected companies. According to 
rules and regulation of Security Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) the firms are bounded to 
publish ownership pattern in their annual reports.  
 
4. Empirical Results  
The summary statistics of the data is presented in Appendix Table A2, A3 and A4 for sample firms for 
the period 2000 to 2007. The results show the mean value of the total asset is 13347.76 (million) and 
the standard deviation is very high showing that we have very larger sized firm and small sized firms in 
the sample. The value of dividend paid per share ranges from 254.1 to 17.0. The sales growth is 
maximum 1345.2 and it ranges to a minimum level -100.0 (millions). The net income per share of the 
firms in the sample is 12.60 (Rs) and the maximum income earned per share by the firms is 63.00 Rs. 
Similarly the average level of manager shareholding in our sample is 14.74 percent which determine 
the most firms in our sample have manager holding more than 15%. While the maximum managerial 
holding in our sample 75.27%. Table A2 presents the summary statistics of the measures of 
performance: Return on Asset, return on equity and Tobin‟s ratio. The ROA and ROE is accounting 
measurement of the performance of the firm while the Tobin‟s Q is value based measurement of the 
performance. The average value of the ROA is 11.48%, the ROA mean value 27.11% and Tobin‟s Q 
average value is 0.57%. The correlation analysis shows that both performance variables ROA and ROE 
have positive and significant value with the dividend, growth and net income respectively, except the 
Tobin‟s Q. This analysis shows that their no multicollinearity among the variables.  
 
4.1 Relationship between Managerial Ownership and Debt Policy 
To analyze the relationship between managerial ownership and firm‟s debt policy, leverage is 
regressed on the managerial ownership with set of explanatory variables: growth, total asset and net 
income. To cope with endogeniety problem 2SLS is used as estimation technique. The first lag of 
explanatory variables are used as instrument variables. We observe a strong negative relation between 
the leverage and managerial ownership as presented in the Table 1 column 1. This result supports the 
hypothesis that there is negative relationship between leverage policy of the firm and managerial 
ownership. As regards other variables, the result indicates that the leverage has negative and significant 
effect on the net income; this implies that the lower level of leverage leads to higher profitability in 
case of firms engage in managerial ownership program. This result supports the evidence that the 
profitable firms use less debt. The results also shows that the leverage effect the size of the firm 
positively. The results suggest that the firms set their leverage policy to take advantage of the retained 
earnings. Therefore we can say that the firms go for leverage to invest in the fixed assets to increase 
their profitability rather to achieve the investment opportunities. The analysis shows that leverage 
policy of the firms negatively affect the firm growth. These findings suggest that the mangers of the 
firms struggle to perform, adopt such policies to increase market value of the equity. These findings are 
confirmed by Titman and Wessels (1988) and Myres and Majluf (1984).  
 
4.2 Relation between Managerial Ownership and Financial Policies 
                                                 
2
 List of variables is provided in Appendix Table A1. 
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Using the 2SLS regression framework, managerial ownership is used as dependent variable and 
regressed on the leverage and dividend with other explanatory variables: growth, total asset and net 
income. The results are documented at. Table 1 column 2. Managerial ownership and dividend have 
negative and significant relationship which supports the hypothesis that there is negative relationship 
between managerial ownership and dividend policy. This finding also supports agency theory 
prediction suggesting that managerial ownership decrease agency cost of equity. Managerial ownership 
is a self monitoring mechanism and also a bonding mechanism. Managerial ownership is bonded 
management personal wealth to firm value (shareholders wealth). Secondly, the higher level of 
managerial ownership leads the situation in personal wealth of management so that it becomes closely 
tied to firm‟s wealth, so that management attempts to decrease the risk of losing wealth in this case. 
We can say that if management has a portion of firm share then dividend will decrease. Empirical 
evidence in the literature suggests that dividend payment decrease asymmetric information occur 
within the firms. However, if a firm has managerial ownership program, the asymmetric information 
by definition will decrease and the effectiveness of dividend policy will decrease. This evidence is also 
supported by the Pautu (2002) and Amitabh (1999). The results also document a negative but 
insignificant relation among the managerial ownership and growth of the firms. Managers are risk 
averse, if the firm has high managerial ownership, the mangers of that firm do not avail the investment 
opportunity due to risk of loss of their wealth.  The same results are confirmed by the Jensen at el. 
(1992). There is a negative and highly significant relation between the managerial ownership and size 
of the firm. The negative coefficient on size is consistent with the hypothesis that managerial 
ownership takes larger position in the firm where they can exercise the most control. Smaller firms are 
more focused on the operations, which might give managers greater control of the operations. Similarly 
the negative coefficient on the size variable exists at least partially because for less wealth is required 
to win a given percentage of a small firm. 
 
4.3 Relation between Managerial Ownership and Dividend Policy 
To find the empirical relationship among the managerial ownership and the firm‟s financial policies the 
third step of the study used dividend as dependent variable and regressed on the leverage and managers 
holding with other explanatory variables growth, size and net income. The results are reported in Table 
1 column 3. The empirical result indicates negative and highly significant effect of dividend on the 
leverage policy of the firms. The result provides the evidence that there is trade-off between agency 
cost and agency equity and align with the contacting model of the dividend. The increasing level of 
dividend payout indicates that firm‟s trend to use leverage to fund its investment since internal cash 
flows already are used to pay dividend. This result also supports free cash flow hypothesis and suggest 
that the firm‟s internal cash flows are used to pay dividend and as a result firms need additional 
external fund in for of leverage. It also suggests that shareholders of Pakistan do not have any strong 
contract to force the firms in order not to pay dividend before meeting its debt obligations.  
 
                  There is a positive and highly significant effect of dividend on the income of the firms, 
which suggest that the dividend paying firms have earned high profit on their shares. This result 
indicates that firms generating more earnings pay high dividends. The analysis also finds positive and 
significant association among the size and the dividend. The results indicate that growth of the firm is 
negatively and insignificantly related with dividend. Therefore, the investment opportunities do not 
affect significantly the firm‟s dividend policy. These results are supported by the finding of the Jensen 
et al. (1992) and Bathala et al. (1994).  
 
Table 1: Relationship between Managerial Ownership, Debt and Dividend Polices  
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
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Managerial ownership -0.40* 
(-2.66) 
 0.60*** 
(1.80) 
Dividend 0.11 
(1.22) 
-0.23** 
(-1.97) 
 
Leverage  -0.04* 
(-2.60) 
-0.01 
(-3.42) 
Growth -0.91* 
(-2.58) 
-0.40 
(-0.74) 
-1.66** 
(1.87) 
Size 0.63* 
(2.27) 
-1.27* 
(-5.54) 
1.58* 
(2.24) 
Net income -0.09 
(-2.99) 
0.12 
(3.40) 
1.96* 
(2.32) 
Constant  -5.40* 
(-2.14) 
11.9* 
(5.29 
-3.71 
(-0.62) 
R
2
 0.44 0.62 0.49 
F-statistic 49.92 99.66 15.66 
DW  1.79 1.93 
Note: Two-stage linear regression is used to cope with the endogenity. Dependent variables are debt, managerial ownership 
and dividend in Model 1, 2 and 3 respectively. The * indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at 5% and *** 
indicates significant at 10% 
 
4.4 Managerial Ownership the Firms Performance   
To examine the empirical relationship between managerial ownership and firm‟s performance, the 
firm‟s performance is measured by the three variables ROA, ROE and Tobin‟s Q. The three 
performance variables are regressed against the managerial ownership and with other control variables 
size, dividend, net income and growth of the firms. The panel data estimation technique is used which 
takes account of the problem of endogeniety and hetroskedasticity. The fixed and random effect 
models are estimated.  
 
                Table 2: Impact of Managerial Ownership on Firm Performance 
  
ROA 
 ROE  Tobin‟s Q 
 Variable  Fixed  Random  Fixed   Random   Fixed  Random 
C  
10.51* 
(8.50)  
-0.27* 
(-2.6)  
0.16* 
2.34 
Managerial 
ownership 
0.02 
(0.21) 
-0.09** 
(-2.5) 
0.02 
(0.069) 
-0.03* 
(-2.8) 
0.003 
(-0.08) 
0.001 
(-0.70) 
Dividend  
0.16* 
(3.33) 
0.21* 
(5.07) 
0.64* 
(3.63) 
0.95* 
(7.47) 
0.001*** 
(1.32) 
0.001** 
(1.59) 
Leverage 
0.000 
(-1.05) 
0.00 
(-1.90) 
0.00 
(-2.2)
**
 
0.00 
(-2.9)
**
 
0.000 
(2.70)
**
 
0.000 
(2.99)
**
 
Growth 
0.02* 
(2.99) 
0.02* 
(2.62) 
0.04** 
(1.52) 
0.03*** 
(1.49) 
0.002 
(-0.96) 
-0.001 
(-0.84) 
Size 
0.01* 
(-5.1) 
0.01* 
(-6.37) 
0.51 
(0.29) 
1.57*** 
(1.42) 
0.06* 
(7.39) 
0.05* 
(6.65) 
Net Income 
0.24* 
(7.57) 
0.25* 
(8.55) 
0.60* 
(5.07) 
0.62* 
(6.31) 
-0.003 
(4.72) 
-0.002* 
(-4.70) 
R
2
 0.68 0.66 0.524 0.47 0.66 0.59 
Adjusted R
2
 0.63 0.65 0.48 0.46 0.61 0.41 
F-statistic 170.30  87.158  156.42  
DW Stat 1.59 1.82 2.0 1.83 1.79 1.79 
observations 461 461 460 460 460 460 
     Note: Panel Regression both the fixed and random models are used.  Dependent variable are ROA, ROE and Q 
(Performance measures). The * indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at 5% and *** indicates significant at 
10% 
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The regression results reported in Table 2 document that the ROA and ROE both have a 
positive and insignificant affect the managerial ownership in the fixed effect
 
model. Therefore, we can 
say that the ownership concentration do not affect the firm‟s performance. When the random effect 
model is applied the finding are contradictory with the fixed effect model. The regression results 
document negative and significant coefficient of managerial ownership with the ROA and ROE. Our 
results are supporting the entrenchment hypothesis which suggests a negative relationship managerial 
ownership and firm‟s performance, explaining that managerial ownership above a certain threshold 
destroys this effect due the conflict between manager and large block holders. The entrenchment theory 
emphasize that the mangers of the firm use the resource for their personal benefit, and decrease the 
firm‟s performance. However, these results do not support our hypothesis that there is positive 
relationship between managerial ownership and performance of the firm and our hypothesis do not 
support the agency theory. Our finding contradicts with the agency theory that as the managerial 
ownership increases the performance also increases. The agency theory argue as the consequences with 
managers shareholders are likely to work hard and create better investment decisions and high 
managerial ownership firms should perform better.  
To sum up, our findings do not support by the agency theory and also deviate for the findings 
of Jensen and Meckling (1976). However, this finding is supported by the Morck and Vishny (1987) 
that the effective control of managers leads to indulge their preferences for non-maximization 
behavior, although to more limited extent than if they have effective control but no claim on the firm‟s 
cash flow. The relationship between the managerial ownership and the performance variables Tobin‟s 
Q is ambiguous and contradicting. The literature documents both and positive and negative relation 
between Tobin‟s Q and management ownership. The findings show a negative and significant 
relationship in both fixed and random effect models. Our findings are supported by the results 
document by the Chen (1993) that a firm performance is positively related with Q when the ownership 
is low and when the ownership level reaches beyond 5% the relationship becomes negative due the 
management entrenchment factor become more prominent at this point. The results also relate with the 
findings of Khan (2007) who shows the negative and significant relation among the Q and managerial 
ownership form Australian capital market.  
 
4.5 Threshold Level of Managerial Ownership on the Firm’s Performance  
The level of ownership concentration stake by manager‟s effect the firm‟s performance is a debatable 
issue in the finance literature. Different studies use different levels of managerial ownership stakes and 
documented different impact for the level of mangers ownership concentration on the firm‟s 
performance. To elaborate this issue in view of the predominance of family based firms in the Pakistan 
capital market scenario, mangers are usually part of the controlling family, the share holding of these 
officers and directors might have different effect on the firm‟s performance. At any given ownership 
concentration, some board members might influence on the corporate decision making than the others. 
e.g. leadership by the firm‟s founders or by their descendants might have different effects on 
performance than professional managers or by officers who are not related to founders. To investigate 
the impact of this ownership concentration on firm value, the level of managerial ownership is divided 
in to the threshold. 0% to 5% as low level of managerial ownership, 5% to 25% moderate level of 
managerial ownership and above 25% concentrated level of managerial ownership. 
The results are presented in Table 3 and provide the evidence that mangers share ownership 
effect the firms performance at the level of concentration from 0% to 5%, both the performance 
indicators ROA and ROE have positive and significant association with ownership. But again the 
performance variable Q shows negative and significant value in both the fixed and random effect. The 
finding for Tobin‟ Q are consistent with the findings of  Khan (2007), who also come up with same 
conclusion in case of Thai Market for low level of managerial ownership. Similarly moderate level of 
managerial ownership .i.e. 5% to 25% we also have positive and significant association of managerial 
ownership with performance of the firms. The third performance variable that is Tobin‟s Q also shows 
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positive and significant values means that at moderate level manager‟s ownership concentration have 
positive effect using Q performance measure of the firm.  
When the high level of managerial ownership is taken with the performance measurements the 
results are consistent because all the performance variables exhibit negative association with 
managerial ownership above 25%. This supports the entrenchment theory and convergence theory 
because as the managerial ownership exceeds above 25 percent the managers become self centered and 
use firm‟s wealth for personal benefits rather increasing the value of the firm from shareholders point 
of view. Therefore, the results support our hypothesis that the firm‟s performance is positively 
associated with managerial ownership at moderate level of managerial ownership from 5% to 25%. In 
the Pakistani equity market scenario where major of the firms are family owned, and the family 
members are the officer and directors of the firm and the major shareholders. These major shareholders 
become self centered and use the resource for their personal benefit rather for the stock-holders. This 
can also supported by the entrenchment and convergence theory that managerial ownership above a 
certain threshold will destroy the firm‟s performance due to the conflict between large block holders 
and minor share holders. This also explain that at certain threshold managerial ownership (above 25%) 
the managers of that firms become conservative and entrenched the firms resources for their personal 
benefits and don‟t avail the investment opportunism and they are no risk takers due to their self 
interest. Our study also concludes that there is non-linear relation between the managers share holding 
and firm‟s performance in the Pakistani equity market. 
 
 Table 3: Evidence onThreshold Level of Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance 
  
ROA 
 ROE  Tobin‟s Q 
 Variable  FIX  RAM  FAX  RAM  FAX  RAM 
MO (0% to 5%) 
6.96* 
(4.08) 
4.58* 
(3.80) 
7.04* 
(3.93) 
6.42* 
(2.40) 
-0.04* 
(-3.909) 
-0.04** 
(-1.68) 
MO (5% to 25%) 
1.92* 
(3.26) 
1.06* 
(2.85) 
1.56** 
(1.71) 
4.32* 
(2.93) 
0.01*** 
(1.42) 
0.04** 
(1.77) 
MO (Above 25%) 
-0.01   (-
0.43) 
-0.04   (-
1.05) 
-0.21 (-
(1.13) 
-1.03 
(-1.20) 
-0.002* 
(-1.97) 
-001 
(-0.04) 
Dividend  
0.16* 
(3.33) 
0.21* 
(5.07) 
0.64* 
(3.63) 
0.95* 
(7.47) 
0.001*** 
(1.32) 
0.001*** 
(1.59) 
Leverage 
0.01 
(-1.05) 
0.001** 
(-1.90) 
0.002* 
(-2.2) 
0.001* 
(-2.9) 
0.01* 
(2.70) 
0.002* 
(2.99) 
Growth 
0.02* 
(2.99) 
0.02* 
(2.62) 
0.04*** 
(1.52) 
0.03*** 
(1.49) 
0.002 
(-0.96) 
-0.01 
(-0.84) 
Size 
0.001* 
(-5.1) 
0.001* 
(-6.37) 
0.51 
(0.29) 
1.57*** 
(1.42) 
0.06* 
(7.39) 
0.05 
(6.65) 
Net Income 
0.24* 
(7.57) 
0.25* 
(8.55) 
0.60* 
(5.07) 
0.62* 
(6.31) 
-0.003* 
(4.72) 
-0.002* 
(-4.7
)
 
R
2
                                                                                                 0.76 
Adjusted R
2
                                                                                                 0.75 
D. W. Stat                                                                                                 1.73 
  Note: The * indicates significant at 1%, ** indicates significant at 5% and *** indicates significant at 10% level 
 
 
5 Summary and Conclusions  
The present study elaborates the empirical impact of managerial ownership on the firm‟s performance 
as well as the firm financial policies focusing the listed non-financial firms of Pakistan. All the 
previous studies are focused on the agency theory and suggest that firm‟s performance can be 
positively affected by the agency conflict between management and shareholders, however this study 
extend the analysis and focus both the entrenchment and agency theory. The sample consists of sixty 
non-financial firm of the KSE 100 index and the period of the study cover 2000 to 2007. The main 
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issue in our estimation procedure is the endogenity which is taken account of by using 2SLS and panel 
data estimation techniques. 
The analysis support that concentration of managerial ownership affects the firms financial 
policies, mainly the leverage and dividend policies. The empirical analysis find out that leverage policy 
variable influence managerial ownership negatively, supporting that the lower leverage level leads to 
high profitability for firms engage low managers‟ ownership program. The result also determines a 
negative and significant association among the mangers ownership concentration and dividend policy 
of the firm. This result is supported by the agency theory prediction suggesting that a firm has high 
managerial ownership program, the asymmetric information will decrease and directly decrease the 
effectiveness of the dividend policy. Beside this the firms with higher managerial ownership decrease 
their perquisites, so the conflict between manager‟s shareholders can be settled.  
Secondly it is observed that in general the managerial ownership positively affect the firm‟s 
performance in the corporate culture of Pakistan where major firms are the family owned and the 
members of family are the officers and managing director of these firms. The director and family 
mangers have great influence on corporate decision making than the others.  
Thirdly, when the ownership level of mangers is a segregated and check out their influence on 
the corporate performance, the threshold of mangers ownership from 0% to 5% affect the firm‟s 
performance positively. Likely when the managers‟ ownership is form 5% to 25% also affect the firms 
positively and support the entrenchment theory that at moderate level mangers ownership affect the 
firms performance positively. When the ownership is above 25% it negatively effect firms performance 
due the conservation and self-centered and entrenchment of the mangers. We also find out there is bell-
shaped/non-linear relationship between managers share holding and the firm‟s performance in the 
equity market of the Pakistan. Our results are confirmed with Kumar (2002) for Indian Market that the 
directors /mangers influence the performance of the firm beyond a certain threshold and which is 
consistent with the fact that many Indian corporate are family dominated enterprises. The implication 
is that managerial ownership structure related to financial policies of the firm and hence decision 
regarding the issues of equity. In Pakistan‟s corporate structure, with concentrated ownership managers 
play an important role in increasing the value of the firm. 
 
 
References 
[1] Agrawal, A. and G, Mandelker, 1987. “Managerial Incentives and Corporate Investment and 
Financing Decisions”, Journal of Finance 42(4), 823 - 837. 
[2] Attiya y Javid, Robina Iqbal 2008. “Does Corporate Governance Affect a Firm‟s Performance: 
A Case Study of Pakistani Market”, NUST Journal of Business and Economics, 1(1), 11-23. 
[3] Agrawal, A. and G. Mandelker, 1990. “Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: 
The case of Antitakeover charter amendments”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 
25(2), 143 - 161. 
[4] Agrawal, A. and N. Nagarajan, 1990, “Corporate capital structure, agency costs and ownership 
control: The case of all-equity firms”, Journal of Finance 45(4), 1325-1331. 
[5] Allen, D., 1993. “The Pecking Order Hypothesis: Australian Evidence”, Applied Financial 
Economics 3(2), 101-1 12. 
[6] Amitabh, S. Duttan, 2002. “Managerial Ownership, Dividend and Debt Policy in the US 
banking Industry”, Journal of Finance 25. 
[7] Brailsford, J. Timothy, Oliver, R. Barry and Pua, L. Sndara, 2002. “Theory and Evidence on the 
Relationship between Ownership Structure and Capital Structure”, Journal of Accounting and 
Finance 42, 1-26. 
[8] Ben-Amar, W., and Andre, P., 2005. “Separation of Ownership from Control and Acquiring 
Firm Performance: The Case Study of Family Ownership and Control”, Working Paper, The 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). 
 15 
[9] Bevan, A., Estrin, S., and Schaffer, M. 1999. “Determinants of Enterprise Performance during 
Transition”. Working Paper 99/03. Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation (CERT). 
[10] Berle, A., and Means, G., 1932. „The Modern Corporation and Private Property’, New York: 
Macmillan. 
[11] Bathala, Chenchuramaiah T. P. Moon Kenneth and Ramesh P.Rao, 1994. “Managerial 
Ownership, Debt Policy and the Impact of Institutional Holdings: An Agency Perspective”, 
Journal of Financial Management 23. 
[12] Bergloef, E., and Von Thadden, E..L., 1999. “The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: 
Implications for Transition and Developing Countries”, (Paper presented at the Annual World 
Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C.). 
[13] Brickley, J.A., R. C. Lease and C.W Smith, 1988. “Ownership Structure and Voting on Anti-
takeover Amendments”, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 267-291. 
[14] Bardley, M. G., A. Jarrell and E. H. Kim, 1984. “On the Existence of an Optimal Capital 
Structure: Theory and Evidence‟, Journal of Financial Economics 47, 103-121. 
[15] Crutchley, C. E., and R. S. Hansen, 1989. “A Test of Agency Theory of Managerial Ownership, 
Corporate Leverage, and Corporate Dividend”, Financial Management, 36-46. 
[16] Chang, S. J. 2003. “Ownership Structure, Expropriation, and Performance of Group-Affiliated 
Companies in Korea. Academy of Management Journal 2: 238-253. 
[17] Cheema, A. 2003. Corporate Governance in Pakistan; Issues and Concerns. The Journal 8: 7-
19, NIPA, Karachi. 
[18] Cheema, A., Bari, F., and Saddique, O. 2003. “Corporate Governance in Pakistan: Ownership, 
Control and the Law”, Lahore University of Management Sciences, Lahore. 
[19] Cubbin, J., and Leech, D., 1983. “The Effect of Shareholding Dispersion on the Degree of 
Control in British Companies: Theory and Measurement. The Economic Journal 93, 351-369. 
[20] Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., E. Ustrand, A. E. and Dalton, D. R., 1998. “Compensation 
Committee Composition as Determinant of CEO compensation. Academy of Management 
Journal 41: 209-220. 
[21] Daily, C. M., Dalton, D. R. and Rajagopalan, N., 2003. “Governance through Ownership: 
Centuries of Practice, Decades of research”, Academy of Management Journal 46(2), 151-158. 
[22] Dalton, D. R., Daily, C.M., Certo, S. T. and Roengpitya, R., 2003. “Meta-Analyses of Financial 
Performance and Equity: Fusion or Confusion?” Academy of Management Journal 46, 13-26. 
[23] De Miguel, A., Pindado, J., and De laTorre, C., 2005. “Ownership Structure and Performance: 
A Comparison of Different Corporate Governance Systems. Corporate Ownership and Control 
2: 76-85. 
[24] Demsetz, H., 1983. “The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Law 
and Economics 26: 375–390. 
[25] Demsetz, H., Lehn, K., 1985. “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and 
Consequences. Journal of Political Economy 93, 1155–1177. 
[26] Demsetz, H., Villalonga, B., 2001. Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance. Journal of 
Corporate Finance 7: 209–233. 
[27] Emery, D. R., and J. D. Finnerty, 1997. “Corporate Financial Management”. 
[28] Ferrei, M. and W. Jones, 1979. “Determinants of financial structures: A New Methodological 
Approach”, The Journal of Finance 34, 631-644. 
[29] Friend, I. and L.H.P Lang, 1998. “An Empirical Test of the Impact of managerial self-interest 
on corporate capital structure”,   The Journal of Finance 43, 271-282. 
[30] Emmons, W. R., and Schmid, F.A., 1998. “Universal Banking, Control Rights, and Corporate 
Finance in Germany”. Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
[31] Fama, E. F., Jensen, M. C.1983a. “Agency problems and residual Claims”. Journal of Law and 
Economics 26 (2): 327– 349. 
 16 
[32] Fama, E., and Jensen, M. C.1983b. “Separation of Ownership and Control‟. Journal of Law and 
Economics 26: 301– 325. 
[33] Fama, E., 1980. “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm”. Journal of Political Economy 
88, 288-307. 
[34] Fama, E., and Jensen, M. C.1985, “Organization forms and investment decision”. Journal of 
Financial Economics 14: 101-119. 
[35] Faccio, M., Lang, P. H., and Young, L. 2001. “Dividends and expropriation”. American 
Economic Review 14: 301-325. 
[36] Kumar, Jayesh, 2002. “Does Ownership Structure Influence Firm‟s Value? Evidence form 
India“presented at the Sixth International Conference of the Association of Asia-Pacific 
Operational Research Societies.  
[37] Kaserer, Chrispo, and  Moldenhauer , Benjamin (2007). “Insider Ownership and Corporate 
Performance: Evidence form Germany‟, CEFS Working Paper Series. 
[38] Khan, Arifur , Rahman, and Balachandran , Balasingham , „Managerial ownership and firms 
performance: Evidence from Australia”, Journal of Financial Economics.  
[39] Faccio, M., Lang, L. 2002. “The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations”. 
Journal of Financial Economics 65, 365– 395. 
[40] Feinberg, R. M. 1975.”Profit Maximization vs. Utility Maximization”. Southern Economic 
Journal 42, 130-134. 
[41] Fernchdez, C., and Arrondo, R. 2005. „Alternative internal control as substitutes of the board of 
directors‟, Corporate Governance 13: 856-866. 
[42] Ghobadian Abby, Regan O' Nicholas, 2006.”The Impact of Ownership on Small Firm Behavior 
and Performance‟, International Small Business Journal 24. 
[43] Hextrix, J. Lawrence and Chan, Haiyang 1993 , „Management ownership and corporate value‟ , 
Journal of Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 14,335-346.  
[44] Hasan, S., T. Christopher and R. Evans, 1988, „‟Directors Remuneration and Firm 
Performance‟ Malaysian Evidence”, Working Paper Multimedia University. 
[45] Jensen, G.R., D.P. Solbereg and T.S. Zorn, 1992, „Simultaneous Determination of Insider 
Ownership, Debt and Dividend Policies‟, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 247-
263. 
[46] Jensen, M.C., K.J. Murply, 1990, „Performance Pay and Top-Management Turnover‟, The 
Journal of Finance, 3-21. 
[47] Jensen, M.C.,1996, „Agency cost and Free cash Flows, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers‟ , 
American Economics Review, 323-329. 
[48] Megginson, W. L, 1997. “Capital Structure Theory, Corporate Finance Theory, Addison-
Wesley. 
[49] Mayers, S.C., 1997, „The Determents of Corporate Borrowing‟ Journal of Financial Economics, 
5, 147-176. 
[50] Muravyev Alexander (2002)."Federal State Shareholdings in Russian Companies: Origin, 
Forms and Consequences for Enterprise performance", BOFIT Discussion papers, No.12. 
[51] Omran Mohammad (2004). "The Performance of State Owned Enterprises and Newly 
Privatized Firms: Empirical Evidence form Egypt”, The Arab Academy of Science and 
Technology and Arab Monetary Fund. 
[52] Ping Jiang (2004),"The Relationship between Ownership Structure and Firm performance: An 
Empirical Analysis over Heilongjiang Listed Companies", Nature and Science, 2:4, pp.87-90. 
[53] Qi Daqing, Wu Woody, Hang Hua (1999)."Shareholding Structure and Corporate Performance 
of Partially Privatized Firms: Evidence form Listed Chinese Companies", the Chinese 
university of Hong Kong. 
[54] Rozeff, M. S., 1982, „Growth Beta and agency costs as Determinants of Dividend Payout ratio‟, 
Journal of Financial Research, 249-259. 
 17 
[55] Yiu Ka Fung, Wing Kong (1999)."Profitability, Ownership Structure and Technical Efficiency 
of Enterprises in the People's Republic of China: A Case of Manufacturing Industries in 
Shinghai", Asia Pacific Journal of Management 16, pp.351-367. 
 
 
 
Appendix  
 
TableA1: Set of Variables 
Financial 
Characteristics 
 Explanatory Variables 
Managerial Ownership MO Percentage of ordinary share owned by Managers and 
directors of the firm 
Dividend DIV Dividend paid per share 
Leverage LEV Long term debt divided by total long term debt plus 
market value of the common stock outsiders own 
Size SIZE Natural log of total assets 
Growth G Book to market value of equity  
Net income NE Net income over net sales 
Return on Asset ROA Profit before depreciation, interest and tax (PBDIT)/ 
total assets.                           
Return on equity capital ROE PBIT / the total outstanding paid up equity capital of the 
firm 
Tobin‟s Q Q Total Borrowings + Market Value Equity) / Total assets 
 
Table: A2 Descriptive statistics 
 DIVID GROW LVRGE MO NE TASSET 
 Mean  10.18  20.52  256.18  14.74  12.61  13347.76 
 Median  6.20  12.30  138.80  0.01  63.00  5556.90 
 Maxim  254.1  1345.2  30980.0  75.27  20.70  150655.7 
 Minim 17.0 -100.00 -2753.60  0.00 -106.40  0.00 
 Std. Dev.  20.05  68.86  1459.85  20.98  21.81  22809.59 
Skewness  6.75  15.40  19.95  1.02  2.68  3.53 
 Kurtosis  65.33  294.024  420.175  2.460  20.49  17.62 
 Obser 469 469 469 469 469 469 
 
Table: A3 Descriptive statistics of performance variables 
 ROA ROE TOBNSQ 
 Mean  11.48  27.11  0.57 
 Median  10.40  25.90  0.58 
 Maximum  50.10  302.75  1.78 
 Minimum -114.40 -293.61 -0.15 
 Std. Dev.  15.05  43.69  0.24 
 Skewness -1.08  0.099  0.52 
 Kurtosis  12.94  17.13  5.83 
 Obser 469 469 469 
 
Table: A4 Correlation Matrix 
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  DIV G LEV MO NE ROA ROE Q SIZE 
DIV 1                 
G 0.02 1               
LEV -0.01 -0.08 1             
MO 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 1           
NE 0.55 0.04 -0.05 -0.04 1         
ROA 0.44 0.10 -0.13 -0.09 0.55 1       
ROE 0.47 0.06 -0.14 -0.01 0.51 0.56 1     
Q -0.04 -0.05 0.15 0.08 -0.19 -0.43 -0.03 1  
SIZE 0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.10 0.07 -0.06 0.12 0.01 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
